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INTIMATE INJURIES: ARE THERE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PROTECTIONS
FROM FAMILY VIOLENCE
J. RANDALL PATTERSON'
I.

INTRODUCTION

In a national upsurge of domestic violence,2 often occurring in
the home of the victim and often committed by a member of the
family, the courts across the United States have been forced to define the limits of government protection from this most intimate
form of abuse. It is estimated that each year as many as sixteen
1. J. Randall Patterson (B.A. The Citadel; J.D. with special distinction Mississippi College), formerly associated with Watkins Ludlam & Stennis, is a sole
practitioner in Waynesville, North Carolina where he practices criminal law, general litigation, and family law. Mr. Patterson is a member of the Family Law Section of the American Bar Association, and is a member of the Mississippi and
North Carolina State Bars.
2. Peggy Y. Lee, New Police Unit Puts Stress on Family Violence Cases,
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1991, at 5; Laura M. Litvan, Panel Eyes More Help for Victims, WASH. TIMES, March 6, 1992, at B3; Brooke A. Masters, Virginia Killing
Renews Spouse Abuse Issue; Woman's Advocates Say Arresting Batterers Isn't
Enough, WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 1990, at C3; Reports of Child Molestation Cases
More than Quadrupled in the Last Year, JERUSALEM POST, Sept. 25, 1991; Linda
Shaw, Fighting Back at Domestic Violence - Project Secures Court Protection,
SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 23, 1990, at C3; Sheryl Stolberg, Report on Child Abuse
Finds Agencies -Deluged,L.A. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1990, at 1.
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million women are injured from some form of spousal violence, 3
and in 1989 alone nearly two and one-half million reports of child
abuse were filed.4 When can an individual rely on state or police
protection from this significant private danger? This reoccurring
question, opaquely shaded by Constitutional and tort law considerations, seems to be generally dependent upon the factual issues
surrounding the incident of violence, and consistently its boundaries of protection are framed not by expectation of protection or
even the actual need for protection, but rather by the relationship
of the victim to the state.
II.
A.

DESHANEY AND ITS PAST

The DeShaney Facts

In 1989, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate and District Court findings in DeShaney v. Winnebago
County Department of Social Services,5 as to the state's non-liability for inadequately providing protective services to a young
child who was beaten so severely by his father that the child, with
over half of his brain tissue destroyed, will remain comatose for the
rest of his life.
The tragic events leading to Joshua DeShaney's severe injuries
began in 1980, when a Wyoming state court, in a divorce proceeding, awarded custody of the child to his father, Randy DeShaney.
In 1982, Christine DeShaney, Randy's second wife expressed concerns to the police that the child was being abused. Based on these
accusations, the Winnebago County Department of Social Services
questioned Randy DeShaney, who denied that any abuse had occurred.' The Department of Social Services did not investigate further, and the matter was closed.7
In January, 1983, the probability of Joshua being abused again
surfaced when Randy DeShaney's live-in girlfriend, Marie, took
Joshua to the hospital for emergency treatment. Marie told hospital authorities that Joshua's injuries, consisting of multiple bruises
and abrasions, were the result of an attack on him by another
child. In spite of this explanation, hospital emergency room per3. LEONARD I. KARP & CHERYL L. KARP, DOMESTIC TORTS, FAMILY VIOLENCE,
CONFLICT AND SEXUAL ABUSE 1

(Supp. 1992).

4. Id. at 2.

5. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
6. Id. at 192.

7. Id.
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sonnel suspected abuse and notified the Winnebago County Department of Social Services, who obtained an Order from a Wisconsin juvenile court, placing Joshua in the temporary custody of
the hospital where he had been admitted.8 The Department of Social Services assembled a "Child Protection Team" consisting of a
pediatrician, a psychologist, a police detective, a county attorney,
several hospital personnel, and several Department of Social Services personnel, including Ann Kemmeter, the caseworker specifically assigned to Joshua's case. The team evaluated Joshua's case
in light of Wisconsin Statutes Section 48.205(1)(a), which allowed
the child to be retained under the protective custody of the court
when "probable cause exists to believe that if the child is not held
he or she will. . . be subject to injury by others."' The team found
no such probable cause or sufficient evidence of abuse and released
Joshua back to his father's care and custody. In conjunction with
Joshua's return home, the team recommended that the child be
enrolled in the Headstart Program, that Randy DeShaney undergo
anti-abuse counseling from the Department of Social Services, and
that Marie, whom Randy suggested had abused Joshua, be required to move out. Randy DeShaney executed a document with
the County Department of Social Services agreeing to these conditions.10 Approximately three weeks later, the court officially closed
the child protection case brought in Joshua's behalf by the Winnebago County Department of Social Services.
Less than one month later, in February, Joshua was again returned to the hospital and treated for "suspicious injuries." Hospital personnel again notified the Department of Social Services
through Ann Kemmeter. Ms. Kemmeter discussed the injuries and
the situation with hospital social workers, and again concluded
that there was insufficient evidence of child abuse to remove
Joshua from the home.1" Joshua was again returned home to the
care of his father.
Over the next year, Ann Kemmeter visited the DeShaney
home approximately twelve times, notating in her files, during
March, that "someone in the DeShaney household was physically
abusing Joshua." 2 In spite of Ms. Kemmeter's notes, neither she
8. Id.
9. WIs. STAT. ANN.

§ 48.205(1)(a) (West 1987).
10. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 192.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 193.
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nor the County Department of Social Services took any formal action to end the abuse or to protect the child. In May, during her
in-home visit, Ms. Kemmeter noticed a lump on Joshua's head but
was told by Randy DeShaney and Marie that the bump had been
caused when Joshua fell off his tricycle. 13 When the caseworker
next visited the DeShaneys in July, she noted that Randy had not
complied with the January, 1983 agreement; Joshua had not been
enrolled in Headstart and Marie had not moved out of the house.
When Ms. Kemmeter next visited the DeShaney home in September, she did not see Joshua, but was told that the child had been
taken to the hospital to be treated for a scratched cornea. 4 During
the October visit, Ms. Kemmeter again noted a suspicious bump on
Joshua's head. During her November visit, Ms. Kemmeter observed a scratch on Joshua's chin that she later commented resembled a cigarette burn.1 5 Additionally, in late November Joshua was
returned to the hospital requiring treatment for multiple injuries,
including a cut forehead, bloody nose, swollen ear, and bruises on
both shoulders. The hospital emergency room personnel, suspecting abuse due to the nature of the injuries, again contacted the
Winnebago County Department of Social Services which took no
action either to further investigate the cause of Joshua's injuries or
to protect him from subsequent abuse.' During January and February of 1984, Ms. Kemmeter made two additional visits to the
DeShaney home and on both occasions was told that Joshua was in
bed and too ill to see her. 7 In March, 1984, Ms. Kemmeter made
another in-home visit to the DeShaneys "and was told that several
days earlier Joshua had fainted in the bathroom for no apparent
reason."'" During that visit, Ms. Kemmeter made no request or effort to see Joshua, nor offered any reason for her failure to further
investigate his condition.' 9
One day later, on March 3, 1984, Joshua DeShaney lapsed into
a coma, his father having beaten him "so severely"2 that a major13. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 812 F.2d 298, 300
(7th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. This is critically important in that through Randy DeShaney's second wife, Christine, the initial attention was drawn to Joshua's abuse.
17. DeShaney, 812 F.2d at 300.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol15/iss1/1
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ity of Joshua's brain tissue had been destroyed." The doctors
treating Joshua discovered, while performing emergency brain surgery, that the condition of the child's head evidenced previous injuries from earlier beatings.2 2 Additionally, Joshua's body was
heavily bruised, solidly indicating long term abuse.23 The emergency treatment was sufficient to preserve the child's life, but
nothing could be done to reverse the effects of the injury to
Joshua's brain.24 Randy DeShaney was convicted of child abuse
and was sentenced to a prison term of two to four years. He was
later paroled before completing the second year of that sentence.23
B.

History and Background

The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution
provides: "No state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."'2 6 In the
past there has been considerable disagreement between courts as
to what actual duties section 1 of the fourteenth amendment imposes on state agencies, not only with regard to child abuse situations,27 but in general, in situations where the agency either knew
or should have known of the impending injury.2 8
The critical issue in any case concerning governmental liability
resulting from the failure to perform an assumed duty lies in the
relationship between the injured party and the government
29
agency.
21. Id.
22. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 193
(1989). While conducting surgery on Joshua's brain, the doctors discovered "a series of hemorrhages" and determined them to be the direct result of long-term
traumatic abuse. Id.
23. DeShaney, 812 F.2d at 300.
24. Id.
25. Paul Reidinger, Why Did No One Protect This Child?, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1,
1988, at 48.
26. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
27. Maureen S. Duggan, Annotation, Failure of State or Local Government
Entity to Protect Child Abuse Victim as Violation of Federal Constitutional
Right, 79 A.L.R. FED. 514 (1986).

28. Sonja A. Sohnel, Annotation, Government Tort Liability for Social Service Agency's Negligence in Placement, or Supervision After Placement of Children, 90 A.L.R.3d 1214 (1979).

29. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 812 F.2d 298, 303
(7th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
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Where the streets are quiet, but people who could be saved are
left to die of neglect or cold or hunger, or are crippled or killed by
their living or working conditions, a different group of people may
suffer, and other theorists may see their suffering as attributable
to human agency, and so class it as part of man's violence to
man.30
To establish liability for state inaction, it is necessary to prove that
the relationship which existed between the injured party and the
government involved more than simple negligence, 3 ' but rather
that it developed from some affirmative act on the part of the state
to assume a duty toward the individual.3 2 This overt act by the
governmental agency has been found to range from a failure to act
where danger is imminent 3 3 to the actual negligent performance of
an assumed rescue.3 4
The ultimate dependency on a state agency, and the one most
likely to mandate a duty of care and protection, is when the state
brings into its custody an individual against his will. Estelle v.
Gamble"5 recognized this duty as between a state prison and an
individual confined there.36 The Court stated, "It is but just that
30. Harris, The Marxist Conception of Violence, 3 PHIL. & PUB.AFF. 192, 219
(1974).
31. See Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980) (no liability for state's
negligent supervision of parolee who later committed murder); Bradberry v.
Pinella County, 789 F.2d 1513 (11th Cir. 1986) (finding no liability when swimmer
drowned due to negligence of county employed lifeguard); Washington v. District
of Columbia, 802 F.2d 1478 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (finding no liability for injury due to
state's failure to remedy an unsafe work place); Fox v. Custis, 712 F.2d 84 (4th
Cir. 1983) (finding no liability for negligent post-release supervision of parolee);
Hull v. City of Duncanville, 678 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1982) (finding no liability for
train-vehicle collision which resulted from negligent maintenance of signals).
32. See United States v. Lawter, 219 F.2d 559 (5th Cir. 1955) (finding liability for negligently performed rescue operation); see also White v. Rochford, 592
F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979) (finding liability for injury which occurred as a result of
police intervention). Cf. Doe v. New York Dep't of Social Servs., 649 F.2d 134 (2d
Cir. 1981) (finding liability due to state "deliberate indifference" to a known
danger).
33. Vonner v. State Dep't of Public Welfare, 273 So. 2d 252 (La. 1973) (holding state liable when social services failed to conform to its own policies on child
placement follow-up investigations, resulting in the death of a child in the foster
home).
34. United States v. Lawter, 219 F.2d 559 (5th Cir. 1955) (holding government liable for individual's death caused by unqualified personnel operating
Coast Guard rescue equipment during rescue operations).
35. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
36. Id. at 104. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); Withers v. Le-
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the public be required to care for the prisoner, who cannot by reason of the deprivation of his liberty, care for himself." 3 This case
concerned the state's duty to provide reasonable medical care to its
prisoners 38 so as not to violate the eighth amendment's3 9 protection against "cruel and unusual punishments."4 0 A case with a similar duty imposed, Youngberg v. Romeo,4 1 concerned a mentally retarded individual who was injured while confined to a state mental
institution.4 2 His mother, as a result of the injuries, brought suit
against the hospital alleging violations of the eighth 43 and fourteenth amendments.4 4 The Court held that the institution owed an
4
affirmative duty of protection to individuals confined therein. 1 "If
it is cruel and unusual punishment to hold convicted criminals in
unsafe conditions, it must be unconstitutional to confine the involuntarily committed - who may not be punished at all - in unsafe
conditions."' 4" The application of these principles mandates a duty
from the state proportionate to the amount of control that it exercises over its citizen.4 7
United States v. Lawter"8 typifies a different, but complete
state assumption of duty for the protection or rescue of an individual against a private danger." In this case the commander of a
Coast Guard helicopter allowed an untrained crew member to operate the helicopter's air-sea rescue equipment resulting in the
vine, 615 F.2d 158 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 849 (1980); Woodhous v. Virginia, 487 F.2d 889 (4th Cir. 1973).
37. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104 (quoting Spicer v. Williamson, 132 S.E. 291, 293
(1926)).
38. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104.
39. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The amendment states: "Excessive bail shall
not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted."
40. Id.
41. 457 U.S. 307 (1982); Cf. Shaw v. Strackhouse, 920 F.2d 1135 (3rd Cir.
1990) (finding no liability for institution's inability to protect institutionalized
person from single incident of sexual abuse by employee).
42. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 310.
43. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
44. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
45. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 316.
46. Id. at 315.
47. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200
(1989).
48. 219 F.2d 559 (5th Cir. 1955).
49. Id. at 562.
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death of the person being rescued. 0 The Fifth Circuit found liability, holding that "the law imposes an obligation upon everyone
who attempts to do anything, even gratuitously, for another not to
injure him by the negligent performance of that which he has undertaken." 5' 1 The-court in Lawter further considered as a basis for
finding liability that the government agency "affirmatively took
over the rescue mission, excluding others therefrom .
"..
52 By
applying this analysis, the court's rationale was that negligent performance of the rescue would increase the likelihood of injury and
thus impose liability.5" Additionally, in White v. Rochford,54 a Seventh Circuit court found liability when a police officer allowed the
children of an arrested driver to remain unsupervised on the roadside. 55 The court in Jackson v. City of Joliet," however, found no
state liability when, in addition to failing personally to rescue, a
police officer negligently directed other potential rescuers away
from the scene of an accident where two individuals were trapped
in their car and eventually burned to death. 5 7 The court in Jackson found that no "special relationship" existed between the
trapped individuals and the police officer sufficient to predicate an
obligation to act in a reasonable manner.58 The court held that the
"car ran off the road and burst into flames for reasons unrelated to
the actions of the police officer [and that] the state officers did not
50. Id. at 561.
51. Id. at 562.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979).
55. But see Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding passenger of impounded vehicle who was assaulted and raped after being abandoned by
police in high crime area was held to have viable § 1983 claim), cert. denied, 111
S.Ct. 341 (1990).
56. 715 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984).
57. Id. at 1202.
58. Id. at 1204. This "special relationship" is crucial to a successful claim for
a violation of constitutional liberties as guaranteed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1993).
See Jensen v. Conrad, 570 F. Supp. 91 (D.S:C. 1983), aff'd, 747 F.2d 185 (1984),
cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985). See also Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't.,
901 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding no "special relationship" between the police
and the general public); Harpole v. Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs., 820 F.2d 923
(8th Cir. 1987) (finding "special relationship" necessary for civil rights action);
Fox v. Custis, 712 F.2d 84 (4th Cir. 1983) (finding no "special relationship" between general public and government); Turner v. City of North Charleston, 675 F.
Supp. 314 (D.S.C. 1987) (holding that "special relationship" was required to require affirmative acts to protect against private violence).

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol15/iss1/1
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create but merely failed to avert danger. ' 59 The Jackson court further speculated that other potential rescuers would not have risked
their safety to effectuate a rescue,6" thus relieving the state of the
possibility of having contributed to the injury." The court in Jackson distinguished its holding from that in White6 2 by concluding
that in the latter the state actually created the danger whereas in
Jackson the "decedents were in great danger before the defendant
appeared."6 3
In cases more factually related to DeShlaney, courts have
shown a myriad of holdings." Vonner v. State65 involved a situation where a county department of social services failed to conform
to its own policies regarding the follow-up investigations of children placed in foster homes.6 6 The court in Vonner found a "causal
relationship between a child's death and the agency's breach of its
rules .... 6 This court further considered the child to be continually in the state's custody while in the foster home and established
a "special relationship" based on that custody sufficient, when coupled with the county's negligence, to find liability." This idea of
the causal link between the child's "special relationship" with the
state, the act of negligence, and the subsequent injury is expanded
in Jensen v. Conrad,6 9 a suit combining the claims on behalf of
59. Jackson, 715 F.2d at 1205.
60. Id.
61. But see Ross v. United States, 910 F.2d 1422 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that
deputy sheriff's interference with a private rescue of a drowning boy was
actionable).
62. White, 592 F.2d at 382.
63. Jackson, 715 F.2d at 1204.
64. Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980) (holding that state nonfeasance was inadequate to prove a violation of the fourteenth amendment); Harpole
v. Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs., 820 F.2d 923 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding that
release of an abused child from hospital into his parents' custody and subsequent
death of the child did not create a civil rights cause of action for the child's
grandmother); Koepf v. County of York, 251 N.W.2d 866 (Neb. 1977) (rejecting
liability for negligent placement of child with foster parents); Vonner v. State
Dep't of Public Welfare, 273 So. 2d 252 (La. 1973) (finding liability against state
for failure to investigate child placed in a foster home); Commonwealth v. Coyle,
28 A. 634 (Pa. 1894) (holding county liable for negligent placement of a child into
a situation which resulted in child's death).
65. 273 So. 2d 252 (La. 1973).
66. Id. at 254.
67. Sohnel; supra note 28, at 1217.
68. Vonner, 273 So. 2d at 256.
69. 747 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied 470 U.S. 1052 (1985).
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1992

9

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 1 [1992], Art. 1

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15:1

several battered children. 0 Although the court failed to find liability due to the state's claim of "good faith immunity,"'7' it clearly
acknowledged that absent the immunity, liability could attach .as a
result of a "special relationship" between the state and an individual.7 2 The court in Jensen further stated three considerations in
finding a "special relationship" for liability purposes:
(a) whether the victim was in the legal custody at the time of the
incident or had been in legal custody prior to the incident; (b)
whether the state had expressed a desire to provide affirmative
protection to a particular class or specific 73individual; (c) whether
the state was aware of the victim's plight.
Much of the rationale of the Jensen court derived from the holding of Doe v. New York City Department of Social Services, 4
which in remanding the case for retrial found that the evidence
was sufficient to have allowed liability.75 The court held that the
state could "be held liable under 1983 if they.., exhibited deliberate indifference to a known injury, a known risk, or a specific duty,
and their failure to perform the duty or act to ameliorate the risk
or injury was a proximate cause of plaintiff's deprivation of rights
under the Constitution. 7' The court further stated this proposition as a two-prong test that required "that the omissions must
have been a substantial factor leading to the denial of a constitutionally protected liberty and property interest [and] that the officials in charge of the agency being sued must have displayed a
mental state of 'deliberate indifference' in order to meaningfully be
termed culpable. '7 7 The court, acknowledging the difficulty of
proving a state of mind, provided "that gross negligent conduct
creates a strong presumption of deliberate indifference. '78 On retrial, the court held that there was sufficient evidence to establish
79
a duty and allowed recovery
The cases finding no liability when an injury occurs as the re70. Id. at 187.
71. Id. at 195.
72. Id. at 194.
73. Id. at 194 n.11. See also Duggan, supra note 27, at 519.
74. 649 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1981).
75. Id. at 149.
76. Id. at 145.
77. Id. at 141.
78. Id. at 143.
79. Doe v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 709 F.2d 782 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 864 (1983).
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sult of the state's nonfeasance do so for a variety of reasons. The
court in Jackson v. City of Joliet8" distinguishes between positive
and negative constitutional liberties. With regard to the fourteenth
amendment, the court provides "that the liberties secured by the
clause include not only the traditional negative liberties - the
right to be let alone, in its various forms - but also certain positive liberties, including the right to receive the elementary protective services. . . ."' Jackson further held that "the men who wrote
the Bill of Rights were not concerned that government might do
too little for the people but rather that it might do too much to
them, [that] the Constitution is a charter of negative rather than
positive liberties.""2 The court in Jensen expounded further on
this perceived framer intent of "a charter of negative liberties; it
tells the state to let people alone; it does not require the federal
government or the state to provide services, even so elementary a
service as maintaining law and order."' 83 The concept that the state
owes no basic protective duty to its citizens against private violence is further addressed in Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Department 84 in which the court found no liability for the state's failure
to respond to repeated calls for assistance.8 In this case, the plaintiff was forced to endure repeated attacks and harassment by her
estranged husband that she alleges could have been prevented had
the police provided the protection that she requested.8" The court
determined that to attach liability in such a situation, a "special
relationship" should be found to exist between the individual and
the state.'
To determine whether a "special relationship" exists, a court may
look to a number of factors, which include (1) whether the state
created or assumed a custodial relationship toward the plaintiff;
80. 715 F. 2d 1200 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984).
81. Id. at 1203.
82. Id.
83. Jensen, 747 F.2d at 192 (quoting Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618
(7th Cir. 1982)).
84. 901 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1988).
85. Id. at 702. See also Turner v. City of North Charleston, 675 F. Supp. 314
(D.S.C. 1987); Bartalone v. County of Berrien, 643 F. Supp. 574 (W.D. Mich.
1986). Contra Smith v. Ross, 482 F.2d 33 (6th Cir. 1973); Azar v. Conley, 456 F.2d
1382 (6th Cir. 1972); Byrd v. Brishke, 466 F.2d 6 (7th Cir. 1972); Huey v. Barloga,
277 F. Supp. 864 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
86. Balistreri, 901 F.2d at 699.
87. Id. at 700.
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(2) whether the state was aware of a specific risk of harm to the
plaintiff; (3) whether the state affirmatively placed the plaintiff in
a position of danger; or (4) whether the state affirmatively committed itself to the protection of the plaintiff. 8
The court further determined that because the state "had not created or assumed a custodial relationship over her, nor [had] the
state actors . . . affirmatively placed her in danger," 89 the relation-

ship between the plaintiff and the police was insufficient to attach
a positive duty. The court held that the "state's awareness of the
plaintiff's plight goes more to the breach of the 'special relationship' than a definition of [that] relationship."9 0
The court in Ellsworth v. City of Racine9 1 applied a similar
rationale and held the Constitution provides no right of protection,
that such a duty must arise from a "special relationship" created
from a particular circumstance. 2 This court also made an important distinction between constitutional and tort causes of action. 3
Although the City did not have a constitutional duty to provide
this service, the City was required to carry out the duty it had
assumed in a non-negligent manner. However, even assuming for
the sake of argument that the City was negligent, 1983 "imposes
liability for violations of rights protected by the Constitution, not
for violations of duties of care arising out of tort law. Remedy for
the latter type of injury must be sought in state court under the
traditional tort-law principles. 4
The court further stated, however, that a constitutional right to
protection could attach by means of a unique or "special relationship" between the citizen and the state. 5 The application of this
rationale would preclude recovery against the state for virtually
any type of government nonfeasance, absent the existence of a
"special relationship."
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. 774 F.2d 182 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1047 (1986).
92. Id. at 185.
93. Id. at 186. See also Jackson v. Byrne, 738 F.2d 1443 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding firefighters had no liability for death of two children which occurred in a fire
during firefighters' strike).
94. Ellsworth, 774 F.2d at 186. See W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON
ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 3 (5th ed. 1984).
95. EUsworth, 774 F.2d at 185.
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C.

The DeShaney Analysis

DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services96 presented several important considerations for the Supreme
97
Court's resolution concerning state liability in child abuse cases.
"The complaint alleged that respondents had deprived Joshua of
his liberty without due- process of law, in violation of his rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment, by failing to intervene to protect him against a risk of violence at his father's hands of which
they knew or should have known." 9' 8 The Court considered various
critical issues including the intent of the fourteenth amendment, 99
the effect of private violence on state duty, ' ° and the necessary
relationship between the child and the state agency to invoke any
state assumption of duty at all.1 01
DeShaney recognized the existence of such a constitutional
duty to protect an individual once the mandated relationship is
established '0 2 but required that the child be in the custody of the
state at the time of injury 0 3 or that the state's negligence or inaction substantially increase the child's risk of injury in order to create that relationship.10 4 The Court distinguished the custodial relationship required to invoke governmental protection from the
failure to protect a child returned to his natural home. 0 5 "The affirmative duty to protect arises not from the State's knowledge of
the individual's predicament or from its expressions of intent to
help him, but from the limitation which it has imposed on his freedom to act on his own behalf."'0 l The Court further held:
That the State once took temporary custody of Joshua does not
alter the analysis, for when it returned him to his father's custody, it placed him in no worse position than that which he would
have been had it not acted at all; the State does not become the
96.
(1989).
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489'U.S. 189
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

189-90.
194.
195.
196.
198.
197.

103. Id.

104.
105.
303 (7th
106.

Id. at 201.
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 812 F.2d 298,
Cir. 1987), aff'd, 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 197.
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permanent guarantor of an individual's safety by having once offered shelter. Under these circumstances, the State had no constitutional duty to protect Joshua.'0 7
The Court determined that although the Department of Social
Services had intervened in his behalf, it had not assumed any continuing or long-term duty to protect Joshua'
since the cessation
of that aid did not increase the child's risk of harm.10 9
This somewhat limited perception of the state's duty to aid an
endangered individual is founded in the Court's analysis regarding
the scope of the fourteenth amendment." 0 The Court stated:
[NIothing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the state to protect the life, liberty, and property of its
citizens against invasion by private actors. The Clause is phrased
as a limitation on the State's power to act, not as a guarantee of
certain minimal levels of safety and security. It forbids the State
itself to deprive individuals of life, liberty, or property without
"due process of law". . . . [T]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to prevent government from
abusing [its] power, or employing it as an instrument of
oppression."'
By applying this exclusion of "positive liberties""' 2 and by determining that the state had not increased Joshua's risk by returning
him to his father's care, 3 the Court held that there was, at the
time of Joshua's final injury, no duty to remove or further protect
him from danger." 4 Since Joshua's relationship with the Department of Social Services was not, by the Court, considered adequate
to impose a duty on the agency to protect the child from nongovernmental injury, and since his father's abuse was private violence,
the Court held that no viable cause of action could be maintained
against the Winnebago County Department of Social Services or
5
Ann Kemmeter."
Although the lower court holding in DeShaney superficially
107. Id. at 201.
108. Id.
109. DeShaney, 812 F.2d at 303.
110. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201.
111. Id. (quoting Davidson v. Cannon, 747 U.S. 327, 348 (1986)).
112. Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984).
113. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 197.
114. Id. at 198.
115. Id.
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rejected the notion of a "special relationship" existing under any
circumstances: "[W]e can find no basis in the language of the due
process clauses or the principals of constitutional law for a general
doctrine of 'special relationships.' "11 The court, by its recognition
of certain limited circumstances in which, due to custody 1 or increased risk of injury, 8 the state assumes an affirmative duty in
the protection of an individual against private violence,1 19 implicitly propagates such a doctrine of "special relationships."
20
DeShaney may be distinguished from cases such as White1
in that, like Jackson,121 the state played no role in increasing or
creating Joshua's risk of injury.12 Since Joshua was already a
member of the DeShaney household and subject to injury before
the state had notice of his abuse, the Court held that there was no
basis for establishing a "special relationship" or creating an affirmative duty on the part of the state. 123 As such, Joshua was not in
state custody," 24 nor had the State increased his risk. 25 The Court
stated "that the harms Joshua suffered did not occur while he was
in the State's custody .... [I]t played no part in their creation, nor
1 26
did it do anything to render him any more vulnerable to them.9
Justice Brennan, in his dissent, opposed this rationale, concluding that Joshua was in state custody at the time of his injuries
and that the state through its nonfeasance increased Joshua's risk
of harm. 2 1 Brennan's argument provided that, due to the nature
and purpose of the Winnebago Department of Social Services and
their role in the removal of abused children, potential rescuers,
even law enforcement officers, would refer child abuse cases to
them for action. 2 8 When the Department of Social Services failed
116. DeShaney, 812 F.2d at 303.

117. Id.
118. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201.
119. Id. at 196.

120. White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979) (finding liability where
police officer created a danger by leaving children of an arrested driver unsupervised on a highway at night).
121. Jackson, 715 F.2d 1200 (finding that police officer who directed potential rescuers away from an accident did not create the danger or injury).

122. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 196.
123. Id.

124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 199-200 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

128. Id. at 200.
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to respond, this nonfeasance "effectively confined Joshua
DeShaney within the Walls of Randy DeShaney's violent home until such time as DSS took action to remove him."1 9 Additionally,
potential rescuers, having notified the Winnebago County Department of Social Services of suspected child abuse, were less likely to
be further concerned with Joshua's safety.13 0 This effectively
placed Joshua at a greater risk than that which he had originally
faced. 3 1 The Brennan argument aligns DeShaney with decisions
1 32
such as Doe v. New York City Department of Social Services
and Estate of Bailey v. County of York 33 where the courts found a
basis for liability. Brennan's view additionally satisfied the "special
relationship" tests created by Jensen."" That test further required, in addition to Joshua being in state custody and at a
greater risk, that the state be aware of Joshua's danger13 5 and express an intention to assist him.1 36 By its initial investigations and
visitations, the Department of Social Services satisfied the aware137
ness and intent prongs of the Jensen Test.
The facts leading to Joshua's injuries 138 strongly suggest that
the state did assume a role for his protection. The critical issue in
keying a continuation of that duty is the relationship between
Joshua and the Winnebago County Department of Social Services. 3 9 The Court stated:
In the substantive due process analysis, it is the State's affirmative act of restraining the individual's freedom to act on his own
behalf - through incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal liberty - which is the "deprivation of
liberty" triggering the protections of the Due Process Clause, not
its failure to act to protect his liberty interests against harms inflicted by other means.1 "
129. Id.
130. Id. at 201.
131. Id.
132. 709 F.2d 782 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 864 (1983).
133. 768 F.2d 503 (3d Cir. 1985).
134. Jensen v. Conrad, 747 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied 470 U.S.
1052 (1985).
135. Id. at 193 n.1.
136. Id. at 194.
137. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 208-210.
138. Id.
139. Id.

140. Id. at 200.
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By applying Brennan's rationale to this standard, Joshua
would have been in state custody and due protection based on his
inability to be removed from danger by anyone other than the
Winnebago County Department of Social Services. 41
The Court only briefly commented on the effect of this decision on tort assumption of duty cases. 14 2 "It may well be that, by
voluntarily undertaking to protect Joshua against a danger it concededly played no part in creating, the state acquired a duty under
state tort law to provide him with adequate protection against that
danger."' 4 3 Although the Court never commented on the impact of
its holding on tort assumption of duty, the "special relationship"
so critical to establish a "constitutional tort"'' " violation, will
surely be felt.
The harsh decision by the Supreme Court in DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Department of Social Services reflects a strict
interpretation of state action under the due process clause.'4 5 The
pivotal issue in this decision, the "special relationship" between
the state and the individual, is one that must be determined objectively by the bench, relying primarily on the facts of that individual case. The weakness in the DeShaney holding, as stated by Justice Brennan in his dissent, is that it allows the state, in situations
of questionable custody, to act or not to act at its leisure. "Today's
opinion construes the Due Process Clause to permit a state to displace private sources of protection and then, at the critical moment, to shrug its shoulders and .turn away from the harm that it
has promised to try and prevent."' 4 6 By allowing the state to assume a protective role and then to-withdraw without warning creates a justified reliance on the state that will certainly increase the
individual's potential for harm, and that should mandate a "special relationship" sufficient to impose liability against the state for
any resulting injuries. " '
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. at 210.
Id. at 201-202.
Id.
Id.

145. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.

146. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 212 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
147. The sting of the DeShaney holding was most recently felt in" D.R. v.
Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 1045 (1993), when the Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
a dismissal of the plaintiffs constitutional law claims. In that lawsuit, the plaintiffs, a group of minor school children were sexually assaulted by other students
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DUE PROCESS

Within the fact-law pattern of a domestic violence case, there
is a basis for several claims well grounded in constitutional law.
Deprivation of substantive due process, the most commonly asserted such claim, arises from the fifth'4 8 and fourteenth 4 9 amendments to the United States Constitution, and concerns the victims
deprivation of certain fundamental rights.
In a substantive due process claim, we are concerned with those
rights which the state may not take away. Substantive due process rights are rights such as those listed in the Bill of Rights and
those rights held to be so fundamental that a state may not take
them away. Among the fundamental rights not listed in the Bill
of Rights or incorporated through the fourteenth amendment are
such rights as abortion [citations omitted]; privacy [citations
omitted]; marriage [citations omitted]; and safety and physical
movement [citations omitted].'50

While such fundamental rights are protected by the Constitution,
that protection is directed against the state itself rather than
against private actors. The courts in their analysis of substantive
due process claims, in which the deprivation of a right was caused
by a private citizen, have consistently required the state's
nonvoluntary physical custody of the victim at the time of injury,"' or a showing of some form of a "special relationship?' 5 " between the victim's injury and the state before any constitutional
duty to defend the threatened right attaches. While the circumstance of physical custody is rarely an issue in domestic violence
cases, the factors which establish the existence of a "special relawhile at school. In spite of the teacher's prior knowledge that some of the male

students in the class had a propensity for violent and sexual misconduct, no actions were taken to protect the female students in the class. The court in its affirmance failed to find the "special relationship" as required by DeShaney as a
prerequisite to liability on a constitutional claim. In a vigorous dissent Judge
Sloviter argued that such a "special relationship" was present due to compulsory
school attendance laws, and aligned the case with Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S.
307 (1982), rather than with DeShaney.
148. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
149. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
150. Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 794 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 489
U.S. 1065 (1989).
151. See note 34, supra.
152. See note 56, supra.
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol15/iss1/1
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tionship" have been widely considered.5 3 In Freeman v. Ferguson,154 a case arising from the murder of a woman and her daughter by her estranged husband, the Eighth Circuit acknowledged
"that a constitutional duty to protect an individual against private
violence may exist in a non-custodial setting if the state has taken
affirmative action which increases the individual's danger or vulnerability to such violence beyond the level it would have been ab1 55
sent state action. 1
While the DeShaney opinion is clearly the leading precedent
on the application of the "special relationship" to the domestic violence context, its holding declined to address the factual setting
of children in foster care.'15 This imposition of foster care by the
state seems a certain catalyst in the creation of the crucial "special
relationship" as addressed in LaShawn A. v. Dixon.5 ' In that case,
the court found a "special relationship" between an injured class of
children, all in state licensed foster care, and the District of Columbia. 5 8 The court reasoned "the rights of children in foster care
59
to be analogous to the rights of the involuntarily committed."'
The logic of the LaShawn Court in aligning the state's duty to protect with involuntary custody, clearly squares with the earlier holding in Youngberg,' and at a minimum, does not run afoul of the
harsh holding in DeShaney.'6 '
153. Id.
154. 911 F.2d 52 (8th Cir. 1990).
155. Id. at 55.
156. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189,
201 n.9. See also William A. Fulton, Note, DeShaney v. Winnebago County DSS:
The "Special Relationship" of the State to Those in Its Custody, 6 COOLEY L.
REV. 527 (1989).
157. 762 F. Supp. 959 (D.D.C. 1991).

158. Id. at 998. See also Laura Oren, DeShaney's Unfinished Business: The
Foster Child's Due Process Right to Safety, 69 N.C.L. REV. 113 (1990).
159. LaShawn A., 762 F. Supp. at 992. But see Doe v. Bobbitt, 881 F.2d 510
(7th Cir. 1989) (rejecting analogy between foster care and incarceration), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 956 (1990).
160. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
161. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189
(1989). See also Stern, Young Lives Betrayed: DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Department of Social Services, 25 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1251 (1991); Thomas A. Eaton & Michael Wells, Governmental Inaction as a Constitutional Tort:
DeShaney and its Aftermath, 66 WA9H. L. REV. 107 (1991); Amy Sinden, Comment, In Search of Affirmative Duties Toward Children Under a Post-DeShaney
Constitution, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 227 (1990); Benjamin Zipursky, DeShaney and
the Jurisprudence of Compassion, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1101 (1990); Laura Oren,
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The LaShawn Court expressly distinguished that case from
DeShaney on two grounds, the obvious fact that the plaintiff children were in foster care, rather than in the care of a natural parent, and that the District of Columbia had clearly violated its own
statutes and policies with regard to the administration of the foster
6 2 The court's
care program."
logic was that these laws created "constitutionally protected liberty and property interests."'6 3 The
state's failure to adhere to its own laws and policies indirectly
caused the injury of the plaintiff children while in state licensed
foster care through the deprivation of those recognized liberty and
property interests. As such, the court held that the rights under
the fifth amendment due process clause were violated.'
In Milburn v. Anne Arundel County Department of Social
Services,'6" a case with a similar fact-law pattern to LaShawn, the
Fourth Circuit reached a completely opposite result. In Milburn a
four year old child's hands were permanently deformed as a result
of abuse by his foster parents. 166 The court, in apparent disregard
of DeShaney's declination to address the foster care issue, applied
DeShaney to the facts and determined that no custodial or "special relationship" existed with regard to the child because the child
had been voluntarily placed in foster care by his natural parents.'6 7
The court, in Doe v. Milwaukee County,"8 affirmed the dismissal
of an action against a county department of social services for their
failure to investigate reported child abuse in a timely manner.' 69 In
Doe, the children were living with their natural mother and her
The State's Failure to Protect Children and Substantive Due Process: DeShaney
in Context, 68 N.C.L. REV. 659 (1990); Roberta M. Saielli, Note, DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Department of Social Services: The Future of Section 1983
Actions for State Inaction, 21 Loy. U. Cm. L.J. 169 (1989).
162. LaShawn A., 762 F. Supp. at 992.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 998. See also Eugene D. v. Karman, 889 F.2d 701 (6th Cir. 1989)
(finding that state licensed foster parents could be liable under § 1983 for the
neglect and injury of a retarded child in their care), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 931
(1990).
165. 871 F.2d 474 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 850 (1989). See also McComb v. Wambaugh, 934 F.2d 474 (3d Cir. 1991) (finding no liability for social
worker nonfeasance when child suffered permanent brain damages as a result of
malnutrition).
166. Milburn, 871 F.2d at 475.
167. Id. at 479.
168. 903 F.2d 499 (7th Cir. 1990).
169. Id. at 505.
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boyfriend. The children's natural father and his parents, after observing abnormal genital irritation and after being told by the children's baby-sitter that she feared the children were being abused
by the boyfriend, contacted the Milwaukee County Department of
Social Services and filed a report of suspected abuse. 7 ' The department declined to investigate the report. After a second report
a week later and after the children endured an additional week of
abuse, the department initiated protective action. The constitutional claim asserted in this case was premised on the fact that the
Department of Social Services failed to investigate the initial report within twenty-four hours,"' as mandated by statute,'7 2 thus
depriving the child of a constitutionally protected interest. "In the
case before us, the DSS made no effort at all to intervene on the
Doe children's behalf. Under DeShaney's clear pronouncement,
the DSS's failure to initiate an investigation, while possibly mis170. Id. at 501.
171. Id.
172. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 48.982(3)(c) (West 1987) states:
(c) Duties of county departments. 1. Within 24 hours after receiving a
report under sub. (3)(a), the county department shall . . . initiate a dili-

gent investigation to determine if the child is in need of protection or
services. The investigation shall be conducted in accordance with standards established by the department for conducting child abuse and neglect investigations and shall include observation of or an interview with
the child, or both, and, if possible, a visit to the child's home or usual
living quarters and an interview with the child's parents, guardian or legal custodian ....
Subsection (3)(a) in turn provides that:
[a] person required to report under sub. (2) shall immediately inform...
the county [social services] department or the sheriff or city police department ...

of the facts and circumstances contributing to a suspicion

of child abuse or neglect or to a belief that abuse or neglect will occur.
The sheriff or police department shall within 12 hours, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays or legal holidays, refer to the county department ... all
cases reported to it. ...
Persons "required to report under subsection 2" are medical and mental health
professionals, social workers, counselors and public assistance workers, school
teachers and day care providers and law enforcement officers "having reasonable
cause to suspect that a child seen in the course of professional duties has been
abused or neglected or having reason to believe that a child seen-in the course of
professional duties has been threatened with abuse or neglect of the child will
occur...." Subsection 2 also authorizes, but does not require, "any other person
.. . having reason to suspect that a child has been abused or neglected or reason
to believe that a child has been threatened with abuse or neglect and that abuse
or neglect of the child will occur" to make a report of child abuse.
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guided, did not violate the Doe's substantive due process rights. '11 3
Even though the court clearly acknowledged that the statutes were
in place and that the statutes were violated by the department's
nonfeasance, its broad application of DeShaney eliminated any basis for a constitutional claim." 4
The Third Circuit applied DeShaney with equally harsh re7 5
sults in Brown v. Grabowski.1
In Brown, Deborah Evans repeatedly sought police protection from her estranged lover who, after
escaping from a drug rehabilitation program, took her hostage and
repeatedly sexually assaulted and beat her over a period of several
days. ' After escaping, Evans returned to the police department
for protection and to file charges against her attacker. At the conclusion of her interview, however, the officers instructed her to return after the weekend to file the complaint. On her way to the
police station, as per their instructions on the following Monday,
Evans was again abducted by the same man.1 77 Her frozen body
was discovered almost a month later "in the trunk of her car,
which was parked outside of a motel where McKenzie [her attacker] had overdosed on drugs."'17 8 The Third Circuit, applying
DeShaney, affirmed the district court's summary judgment against
the plaintiff on the substantive due process claim, holding that Evans was not in state custody at the time of her death, and the facts
of the case did not support the recognition of a "special relationship" between Evans and the police.17 9 In Losinski v. County of
Trempealeau,8 0 Julie Losinski in fear of her husband, requested
police protection and had a deputy sheriff accompany her to her
trailer to remove personal belongings.' 81 While there, her husband
became abusive and eventually shot Julie in the head while the
173. Doe, 903 F.2d at 502.
174. Id. at 505.
175. 922 F.2d 1097 (3d Cir. 1990).
176. Id. at 1102.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1114. See Hynson v. City of Chester, 731 F. Supp. 1236 (E.D. Pa.
1990) (applying DeShaney and found no "special relationship" between murder
victim and state, even though v¢ictim had sought police protection from the
threats of her boyfriends); Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696 (9th
Cir. 1988) (court of appeals affirming district court's finding of no state duty of
protection toward victim of domestic abuse even though victim had actively
sought protection).
180. 946 F.2d 544 (7th Cir. 1991).
181. Id. at 547.
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deputy looked on.18 2 In a due process claim filed by her children,
the court invoked the armor of DeShaney and in denying liability
stated, "[a]lthough the state walked with Julie as she approached
the 'lions den', it did not force her to proceed. It did not encourage
her to continue. 111 3 This blind application of the DeShaney doctrine to preclude the due process claim failed to consider the victims' reliance on the state's protection as she reached the "lions
den." In this context, it seems apparent that the very presence of
the state increased the risk of harm, by providing as it did to
Joshua DeShaney, a false sensation of personal security.
IV.

EQUAL PROTECTION

A novel theory of recovery being asserted in more domestic
abuse cases is that of state violation of equal protection as guaranteed by the fifth"" and fourteenth ' 5 amendments and enforced by
Section 1983 of United States Code.188 The crux of this argument
is that often police or social services authorities take domestic
abuse reports less seriously, and fail to act on them as quickly as
87
they would have, had the attacker been a stranger to the victim,
thus by their inaction directly discriminating against women, the
most common victim in a domestic attack. This classification of
182. Id. at 548.
183. Id. at 550.
184. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
185. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
186. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1993) provides: Every person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
187. See James T.R. Jones, Battered Spouses' Section 1983 Damage Actions
Against the Unresponsive Police After DeShaney, 93 W. VA. L. REV. 251 (1991);
Litsky, Explaining the Legal System's Inadequate Response to the Abuse of
Women: A Lack of Coordination,8 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 149 (1990); Laura S.
Haper, Note, Battered Women Suing Police for Failure to Intervene: Viable Legal Avenues After DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1393 (1990); Gary M. Bishop, Note, Section 1983 and
Domestic Violence: A Solution to the Problem of Police Officers' Inaction, 30
B.C.L. REV. 1357 (1989); Ammy Eppler, Note, Battered Women and the Equal
ProtectionClause: Will the Constitution Help Them When the Police Won't?, 95
YALE L.J. 788 (1986); Maria L. Marcus, Conjugal Violence: The Law of Force and
the Force of Law, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1657 (1981).
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domestic abuse victims as minorities, and a showing that they were
injured as a result of state nonfeasance because of that classification, clearly presents a cause of action under the equal protection
guarantees, and may well be the avenue around the DeShaney
abyss.
To successfully assert this constitutional claim through the
mechanism of-section 1983, the plaintiff must present evidence of
discriminatory intent in the provision and availability of police
protection.1 8 "It is not necessary to demonstrate that the challenged action was taken solely for discriminatory purposes, it is
necessary only to prove that a discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor. "' 1 8' 9 In Watson v. Kansas City, 90 the plaintiff repeatedly sought police protection from the abusive treatment of her
husband, who coincidentally happened to be a police officer. Although the police took her reports, they effected no protective services, and eventually Ms. Watson was raped, beaten, and stabbed
by her husband. 9 ' The plaintiff in this case effectively utilized statistical evidence of police.arrests in assault cases 92 to show a discriminatory practice by the police in domestic violence investigations, and thereby overcame a district court defense summary
judgment.193 An earlier case, Thurman v. City of Torrington9 4 involved a fact-law pattern very similar to Watson. In Thurman, the
plaintiff, Tracey Thurman, requested police protection after repeated death threats by her estranged husband. Even after the issuance of a restraining order, the threats continued until she was
ultimately attacked and repeatedly stabbed in the throat by her
ex-husband. 9 5 The court in addressing the equal protection claim
opined:
A man is not allowed to physically abuse or endanger a woman
merely because he is her husband. Concomitantly, a police officer
may not knowingly refrain from interference in such violence, and
188. Watson v. Kansas City, 857 F.2d 690 (10th Cir. 1988).
189. Id. at 694.
190. 857 F.2d 690 (10th Cir. 1988).
191. Id. at 692-693.
192. Ms. Watson presented evidence that during a relevant period of time, in
the same city in which her attacks occurred, that arrests were 15% less likely to
occur in domestic assault cases than in those outside of the domestic context. Id.
at 695-96.
193. Watson, 857 F.2d at 695.
194. 595 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984).
195. Id. at 1525.
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may not "automatically decline to make an arrest simply because
the assaulter and his victim are married to each other ...." [citation omitted.] Such inaction on the part of the officer is a denial
of the equal protection of the laws.196
While some courts may apply DeShaney to summarily defeat
any section 1983 claim arising from a domestic abuse fact pattern,
McKee v. City of Rockwall' poses a hypothetical that reduces the
momentum of DeShaney with regard to equal protection claims.
The court initially observes, "DeShaney specifically does not address claims based upon illegitimate distribution of public services
in contravention of the Equal Protection Clause." '98 The court
then suggests:
Imagine that in DeShaney, Winnebago County had an intentional
policy to intervene only in family abuse cases when the family is
white, not to intervene when the family is black, that Joshua
DeShaney was black and died because of the County's failure to
intervene. The majority would have us believe that no equal protection violation exists because "[f]ootnote three [of DeShaney]
does not permit plaintiffs to circumvent the rule of DeShaney by
converting every Due Process claim into an Equal Protection
claim via an allegation that state officers99exercised discretion to
1'
act in one incident but not in another.'
In that context, by simply interjecting color as a factor, what
some courts have held inactionable under DeShaney, clearly becomes a significant constitutional law violation. 00 Further, the text
of "footnote three" '0 1 is considerably more benign than some
courts have implied, and should in many domestic abuse cases illuminate the means to a constitutional law recovery through the
equal process clause.20 2
In the above hypothetical, Joshua, now disfavored and neglected, because of his color and injured because of a police policy
196. Id. at 1528 (quoting Bruno v. Codd, 396 N.Y.S.2d 974, 976 (N.Y. 1977)).
197. 877 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1023 (1990).
198. Id. at 417-418.
199. Id. at 418.
200. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982); Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
201. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 197 n.3. ("The State may not, of course, selectively deny its protective services to certain disfavored minorities without violating the Equal Protection Clause.").
202. U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV.
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not to respond to the emergency calls of blacks, has little burden
in the assertion of his equal protection claim. Once the discrimination is proven, since race is a suspect classification, the state must
undergo a strict scrutiny standard of review and articulate a sub0 3
stantial governmental interest in the enforcement of their policy,
which of course is impossible in a de jure racial discrimination fact
pattern. Under this hypothetical, the injured Joshua has a means
of recovery against the state.
Consider next the same hypothetical substituting the disability of sex instead of color. Now Joshualina, a disfavored female, is
injured due to a police policy of not promptly responding to a call
for help from females. The policy is blatantly discriminatory and
will have an expected discriminatory effect on all females in the
community. This classification, though not as suspect as race, still
requires the state to prove an important government interest in
the enforcement of their policy.20 4 In this gender tainted context,
Joshualina probably will still recover.
Advancing the hypothetical more toward reality, consider the
result if a victim of a domestic attack alleged that a police policy
advocated responding less than promptly to calls associated with
domestic violence. The effect of this policy is to create a condition
of de jure discrimination against domestic abuse victims, traditionally women and children and a de facto discrimination against
women and children traditionally domestic abuse victims. What
would be the appropriate standard by which to judge the government's interest? While the quasi-suspect sex classification is
clearly entitled to a substantial governmental interest level of review, should the same class of abuse victims created by the de
facto discrimination not receive the same standard of review? If, as
in Watson,105 a prima facie case of discrimination can be proven,
and the state is required to pass constitutional muster through at
least a substantial governmental interest standard of review, the
victims of domestic abuse may have a viable means of recovery
and, through the Equal Protection Clause, may be able to avoid
the judicial violence of DeShaney.
203.
U,S. 537
204.
205.

See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
(1896); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
See Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
Watson v. Kansas City, 857 F. 2d 690 (10th Cir. 1988).
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V.

CONCLUSION

The DeShaney holding, the harpy of constitutional protections, is invoked regularly to summarily eliminate federal claims
arising from domestic abuse. While most such substantive due process claims may well be disposed of through the DeShaney doctrine, others may be won by a showing that the victim was in some
form of state custody at the time of injury, or that the state,
through its negligence or nonfeasance contributed to the victims
plight.
The Equal Protection Clause provides an additional route
through DeShaney. In that domestic abuse victims, by their very
nature are a unique class, a showing of discriminatory policy by
the state in their response to reports of domestic violence, may be
adequate to assert a successful equal protection claim. Although
DeShaney is recognized as the guiding doctrine in domestic abuse
cases, its bite is dulled in the equal protection context, thus providing the victims of domestic violence a viable means to assert
claims against the state. As a result of state liability in such cases,
legislators and administrators may be forced to descend the ivory
tower and effect workable government protections from domestic
abuse, the most intimate injury.
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